

Apple Transparency Report: Government and Private Party Requests

January 1 - June 30, 2019

Introduction

Apple is very seriously committed to protecting your data and we work hard to deliver the most secure hardware, software and services available. We believe our customers have a right to understand how their personal data is managed and protected. This report provides information regarding requests Apple received from government agencies worldwide and U.S. private parties from January 1 through June 30, 2019.

Types of requests we receive

Apple receives various forms of legal requests seeking information from or actions by Apple. We receive requests from governments globally where we operate and from private parties.

Government request circumstances can vary from instances where law enforcement agencies are working on behalf of customers who have requested assistance regarding lost or stolen devices, to instances where law enforcement are working on behalf of customers who suspect their credit card has been used fraudulently to purchase Apple products or services, to instances where an account is suspected to have been used unlawfully. Requests can also seek to preserve an Apple account, restrict access to an Apple account or delete an Apple account. Additionally, requests can relate to emergency situations where there is imminent harm to the safety of any person.

Private party request circumstances generally relate to instances where private litigants are involved in either civil or criminal proceedings.

Types of legal requests Apple receives from the United States can be: subpoenas, court orders, search warrants, pen register/trap and trace orders, or wiretap orders.

Types of legal requests Apple receives internationally can be: Production Orders (Australia, Canada), Tribunal Orders (New Zealand), Requisition or Judicial Rogatory Letters (France), Solicitud Datos (Spain), Ordem Judicial (Brazil), Auskunftsersuchen (Germany), Obligation de dépôt (Switzerland), 個人情報の開示依頼 (Japan), Personal Data Request (United Kingdom), as well as equivalent court orders and/or requests from other countries.

The restrictions imposed by the sanctions laws generally prohibit Apple from responding to requests from countries, territories or governments sanctioned by the U.S. Department of Treasury, with the exception of requests involving exempt informational material or where prior authorization has been secured.

Types of customer data sought in requests

The type of customer data sought in requests varies depending on the case under investigation. For example, in stolen device cases, law enforcement generally seek details of customers associated with devices or device connections to Apple services. In credit card fraud cases, law enforcement generally seek details of suspected fraudulent transactions. Depending on what the legal request asks, Apple will provide subscriber or transaction details in response to valid legal requests received.

In instances where an Apple account is suspected of being used unlawfully, law enforcement may seek details of the customer associated with the account, account connections or transaction details or account content. Any U.S. government agency seeking customer content data from Apple must obtain a search warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause. International requests for content must comply with applicable laws, including the U.S. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). A request under a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty or Agreement with the U.S. is in compliance with ECPA.

The type of customer data sought in emergency situations generally relates to details of customers' connection to Apple services. We have a dedicated team available around the clock to respond to emergency requests. Apple processes emergency requests from law enforcement globally on a 24/7 basis. An emergency request must relate to circumstances involving imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to any person. If Apple believes in good faith that it is a valid emergency, we may voluntarily provide information to law enforcement on an emergency basis.



How we manage and respond to requests

Apple has a centralized and standardized process for receiving, tracking, processing, and responding to legal requests from law enforcement, government, and private parties worldwide, from when a request is received until when a response is provided.

Government and private entities are required to follow applicable laws and statutes when requesting customer information and data. We contractually require our service providers to abide by the same standard for any government information requests for Apple data. Our legal team reviews requests received to ensure that the requests have a valid legal basis. If they do, we comply with the requests and provide data responsive to the request. If we determine a request does not have a valid legal basis, or if we consider it to be unclear, inappropriate and/or over-broad, we challenge or reject it.

How we count requests and responses

Apple counts requests received from government agencies worldwide and United States private parties within the reporting period in which they are received. Overall numbers of requests and responses are reported.

A request with a valid legal basis is processed and responded to, and is counted as one request. A request that is challenged/rejected is counted as one request. Where new legal process is submitted to amend the request, it is counted as a new request. We count each request we challenge or reject for account-based, account restriction/deletion, emergency and private party requests; and report these numbers accordingly.

We count the number of discernible devices, financial identifiers, and/or accounts specified in requests, and report these accordingly by type. If there are two identifiers for one device in a request, for example a serial number and IMEI number, we count this as one device. If there are multiple identifiers for one account in a request, for example Apple ID, full name and phone number, we count this as one account.

For United States Government Requests by Legal Process Type reporting, where two types of legal process are combined in a single request, such as a search warrant with an incorporated court order, we record the request at the highest level of legal process and the request would be reported as a search warrant. An exception is where a pen register/trap and trace order is received; this is counted as a pen register/trap and trace order, notwithstanding that it may include a search warrant.

How we report requests and responses

We report on requests and responses in the following categories:

- 1) Worldwide Government Device Requests
- 2) Worldwide Government Financial Identifier Requests
- 3) Worldwide Government Account Requests
- 4) Worldwide Government Account Preservation Requests
- 5) Worldwide Government Account Restriction/Deletion Requests
- 6) Worldwide Government Emergency Requests
- 7) United States Government National Security Requests
- 8) United States Government Device Requests by Legal Process Type
- 9) United States Government Financial Identifier Requests by Legal Process Type
- 10) United States Government Account Requests by Legal Process Type
- 11) United States Private Party Requests for Information
- 12) United States Private Party Requests for Account Restriction/Deletion
- 13) Worldwide Government App Store Takedown Requests - Legal Violations
- 14) Worldwide Government App Store Takedown Requests - Platform Policy Violations

For government agency requests for customer information and data, we report the numbers of requests we receive and our responses in various categories. For United States National Security requests for customer information and data, we report as much detail as we are legally allowed. In order to report FISA non-content and content requests in separate categories, Apple is required by law to delay reporting by 6 months and report the numbers in ranges of 500, pursuant to the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.

Customer notification

When we receive an account request seeking our customers' information and data, we notify the customer that we have received a request concerning their personal data except where we are explicitly prohibited by the legal process, by a court order Apple receives, or by applicable law. We reserve the right to make exceptions, such as instances where we believe providing notice creates a risk of injury or death to an identifiable individual, or where the case relates to child endangerment, or where notice is not applicable to the underlying facts of the case.



**Table 1: Worldwide Government Device Requests
January 1 - June 30, 2019**

Table 1 provides information regarding device-based requests received. Examples of such requests are where law enforcement agencies are working on behalf of customers who have requested assistance regarding lost or stolen devices. Additionally, Apple regularly receives multi-device requests related to fraud investigations. Device-based requests generally seek details of customers associated with devices or device connections to Apple services.

Country or Region ¹	# of Device Requests Received	# of Devices Specified in the Requests	# of Device Requests Where Data Provided	% of Device Requests Where Data Provided
Asia Pacific				
Australia	1,875	121,011	1,518	81%
China mainland	906	2,691	874	96%
Hong Kong	358	687	325	91%
Japan	1,160	4,711	1,008	87%
Macau	1	1	1	100%
Malaysia	1	1	1	100%
New Zealand	296	311	252	85%
Singapore	1,445	1,501	1,264	87%
South Korea	70	8,850	43	61%
Taiwan	88	151	63	72%
Thailand	7	8	4	57%
Asia Pacific Total	6,207	139,923	5,353	86%
Europe, Middle East, India, Africa				
Andorra	35	36	28	80%
Austria	373	1,207	296	79%
Belgium	142	229	118	83%
Bulgaria	1	1	0	0%
Cyprus	1	1	0	0%
Czech Republic	79	132	68	86%
Denmark	45	48	29	64%
Finland	5	1,100	5	100%
France	920	1,981	685	74%
Georgia	1	6	0	0%
Germany	13,558	21,368	11,042	81%
Greece	98	111	90	92%
Hungary	45	2,398	33	73%
India	55	135	28	51%
Iran	1	1	0	0%
Ireland	98	138	84	86%
Italy	394	1,033	241	61%
Kenya	4	11	4	100%
Luxembourg	13	38	12	92%
Malta	1	1	0	0%
Netherlands	27	41	17	63%
Norway	27	43	16	59%
Poland	24	1,537	19	79%
Portugal	154	200	116	75%
Qatar	2	3	0	0%
Romania	11	11	9	82%
Russia	1,219	1,790	998	82%
Slovakia	1	1	0	0%
Slovenia	33	355	27	82%
South Africa	10	234	10	100%
Spain	1,616	2,915	1,256	78%
Sweden	104	300	96	92%
Switzerland	230	619	194	84%
Turkey	46	56	19	41%
Ukraine	1	2	0	0%
United Arab Emirates	1	1	0	0%
United Kingdom	617	2,745	469	76%
Europe, Middle East, India, Africa Total	19,992	40,828	16,009	80%
Latin America				
Argentina	2	2	1	50%
Brazil	703	2,858	601	85%
Chile	50	76	39	78%
Colombia	4	19	2	50%
Paraguay	1	1	0	0%
Latin America Total	760	2,956	643	85%
North America				
Canada	19	407	17	89%
Mexico	4	6	2	50%
United States of America	4,796	11,457	4,027	84%
North America Total	4,819	11,870	4,046	84%
Worldwide Total	31,778	195,577	26,051	82%

¹ Only countries / regions where Apple received device requests during the report period of January 1 - June 30, 2019, are listed.



of Device Requests Received

The number of device-based requests received from a government agency seeking customer data related to specific device identifiers, such as serial number or IMEI number. Requests can be in various formats such as subpoenas, court orders, warrants, or other valid legal requests. We count each individual request received from each country/region and report the total number of requests received by country/region.

of Devices Specified in the Requests

The number of devices specified in the requests. One request may contain one or multiple device identifiers. For example, in a case related to the theft of a shipment of devices, law enforcement may seek information related to several device identifiers in a single request. We count the number of devices identified in each request, received from each country/region, and report the total number of devices specified in requests received by country/region.

of Device Requests Where Data Provided

The number of device-based requests that resulted in Apple providing data, such as customers associated with devices, device connections to Apple services, purchase, customer service, or repair information, in response to a valid legal request. We count each device-based request where we provide data and report the total number of such instances by country/region.

% of Device Requests Where Data Provided

The percentage of device-based requests that resulted in Apple providing data. We calculate this based on the number of device-based requests that resulted in Apple providing data per country/region, compared to the total number of device-based requests Apple received from that country/region.



**Table 2: Worldwide Government Financial Identifier Requests
January 1 - June 30, 2019**

Table 2 provides information regarding financial identifier-based requests received. Examples of such requests are where law enforcement agencies are working on behalf of customers who have requested assistance regarding suspected fraudulent credit card activity used to purchase Apple products or services. Financial identifier-based requests generally seek details of suspected fraudulent transactions.

Country or Region ¹	# of Financial Identifier Requests Received	# of Financial Identifiers Specified in the Requests	# of Financial Identifier Requests Where Data Provided	% of Financial Identifier Requests Where Data Provided
Asia Pacific				
Australia	99	858	72	73%
China mainland	8	1,415	7	88%
Hong Kong	155	204	106	68%
Japan	157	3,874	121	77%
Macau	13	13	11	85%
Malaysia	1	1	0	0%
New Zealand	8	225	6	75%
Singapore	66	413	58	88%
South Korea	18	20	13	72%
Taiwan	206	379	188	91%
Thailand	3	4	1	33%
Asia Pacific Total	734	7,406	583	79%
Europe, Middle East, India, Africa				
Austria	40	382	24	60%
Belgium	24	92	23	96%
Czech Republic	20	20	15	75%
Denmark	5	5	0	0%
Estonia	3	3	3	100%
Finland	2	2	1	50%
France	199	434	143	72%
Germany	1,072	5,378	911	85%
Greece	2	4	2	100%
Hungary	1	1	1	100%
India	184	185	79	43%
Ireland	8	45	5	63%
Italy	155	251	38	25%
Netherlands	2	6	2	100%
North Macedonia	1	1	0	0%
Norway	6	6	3	50%
Poland	27	28	24	89%
Portugal	15	21	11	73%
Romania	4	4	2	50%
Russia	17	17	4	24%
Slovenia	2	2	2	100%
Spain	855	898	548	64%
Sweden	2	2	2	100%
Switzerland	110	1,091	94	85%
Turkey	170	171	110	65%
United Arab Emirates	1	1	1	100%
United Kingdom	56	2,421	45	80%
Europe, Middle East, India, Africa Total	2,983	11,471	2,093	70%
Latin America				
Argentina	1	1	0	0%
Brazil	8	16	5	63%
Chile	1	1	0	0%
Costa Rica	4	4	1	25%
Latin America Total	14	22	6	43%
North America				
Canada	15	305	11	73%
United States of America	918	4,695	739	81%
North America Total	933	5,000	750	80%
Worldwide Total	4,664	23,899	3,432	74%

¹ Only countries / regions where Apple received financial identifier requests during the report period of January 1 - June 30, 2019, are listed.



of Financial Identifier Requests Received

The number of financial identifier-based requests received from a government agency seeking customer data related to specific financial identifiers, such as credit card or gift card number. Financial identifier-based requests can be in various formats such as subpoenas, court orders, warrants, or other valid legal requests. We count each individual request received from each country/region and report the total number of requests received by country/region.

of Financial Identifiers Specified in the Requests

The number of financial identifiers specified in the requests. One request may contain one or multiple financial identifiers. For example, in a case related to large scale fraud, law enforcement may seek information related to several credit card numbers in a single request. We count the number of financial identifiers identified in each request, received from each country/region, and report the total number of financial identifiers specified in requests received by country/region.

of Financial Identifier Requests Where Data Provided

The number of financial identifier-based requests that resulted in Apple providing data, such as transaction details, in response to a valid legal request. We count each financial identifier-based request where we provide data and report the total number of such instances by country/region.

% of Financial Identifier Requests Where Data Provided

The percentage of financial identifier-based requests that resulted in Apple providing data. We calculate this based on the number of financial identifier-based requests that resulted in Apple providing data per country/region, compared to the total number of financial identifier-based requests Apple received from that country/region.



**Table 3: Worldwide Government Account Requests
January 1 - June 30, 2019**

Table 3 provides information regarding account-based requests received. Examples of such requests are where law enforcement agencies are working on cases where they suspect an account may have been used unlawfully or in violation of Apple's terms of service. Account-based requests generally seek details of customers' iTunes or iCloud accounts, such as a name and address; and in certain instances customers' iCloud content, such as stored photos, email, iOS device backups, contacts or calendars.

Country or Region ¹	# of Account Requests Received	# of Accounts Specified in the Requests	# of Account Requests Challenged in Part or Rejected in Full	# of Account Requests Where Only Non-Content Data Provided	# of Account Requests Where Content Data Provided	% of Account Requests Where Data Provided
Asia Pacific						
Australia	113	177	22	82	1	73%
China mainland	25	15,666	0	23	1	96%
Hong Kong	2	2	0	2	0	100%
Japan	307	529	41	244	0	79%
Macau	1	1	0	1	0	100%
New Zealand	10	28	1	5	0	50%
Singapore	40	48	1	29	0	73%
South Korea	22	31	6	10	0	45%
Taiwan	395	1,056	10	353	0	89%
Thailand	1	1	0	1	0	100%
Asia Pacific Total	916	17,539	81	750	2	82%
Europe, Middle East, India, Africa						
Andorra	1	1	0	1	0	100%
Austria	12	17	3	7	0	58%
Belgium	12	15	1	9	0	75%
Czech Republic	9	10	1	5	0	56%
Denmark	5	6	4	0	0	0%
Estonia	2	6	0	2	0	100%
Finland	10	17	0	9	0	90%
France	238	251	30	165	0	69%
Germany	459	603	35	344	0	75%
Greece	3	3	1	2	0	67%
Hungary	5	5	0	3	0	60%
India	20	31	6	14	0	70%
Iran	1	1	1	0	0	0%
Ireland	5	7	1	4	0	80%
Israel	1	2	0	1	0	100%
Italy	44	47	23	18	1	43%
Malta	1	1	0	1	0	100%
Netherlands	57	88	22	26	2	49%
Norway	4	4	3	1	0	25%
Poland	10	10	2	8	0	80%
Portugal	4	4	2	2	0	50%
Qatar	2	2	2	0	0	0%
Romania	1	1	0	1	0	100%
Russia	23	101	13	10	0	43%
Slovenia	2	2	0	2	0	100%
Spain	69	99	19	40	0	58%
Sweden	25	33	1	21	1	88%
Switzerland	40	63	10	24	0	60%
Turkey	28	33	9	13	0	46%
Ukraine	1	9	1	0	0	0%
United Arab Emirates	1	1	1	0	0	0%
United Kingdom	364	456	15	306	2	85%
Europe, Middle East, India, Africa Total	1,459	1,929	206	1,039	6	72%
Latin America						
Argentina	1	1	0	1	0	100%
Brazil	448	2,745	9	42	351	88%
Chile	7	8	1	5	0	71%
Costa Rica	6	6	2	5	0	83%
Latin America Total	462	2,760	12	53	351	87%
North America						
Canada	17	69	2	16	0	94%
Mexico	7	7	5	2	0	29%
United States of America	3,619	15,301	119	1,691	1,568	90%
North America Total	3,643	15,377	126	1,709	1,568	90%
Worldwide Total	6,480	37,605	425	3,551	1,927	85%

¹ Only countries / regions where Apple received account requests during the report period of January 1 - June 30, 2019, are listed.



of Account Requests Received

The number of account-based requests received from a government agency seeking customer data related to specific Apple account identifiers, such as Apple ID or email address. Account-based requests can be in various formats such as subpoenas, court orders, warrants, or other valid legal requests. We count each individual request received from each country/region and report the total number of requests received by country/region.

of Accounts Specified in the Requests

The number of accounts specified in the requests. One request may contain one or multiple account identifiers. For example, in a case related to suspected phishing, law enforcement may seek information related to several accounts in a single request. We count the number of accounts identified in each request, received from each country/region, and report the total number of accounts specified in requests received by country/region.

of Account Requests Challenged in Part or Rejected in Full

The number of account-based requests that resulted in Apple challenging the request in part, or rejecting the request in full, based on grounds such as a request does not have a valid legal basis, or is unclear, inappropriate, and/or over-broad. For example, Apple may reject a law enforcement request if it considers the scope of data requested as excessively broad for the case in question. We count each account-based request where we challenge it in part, or reject it in full, and report the total number of such instances by country/region.

of Account Requests Where Only Non-Content Data Provided

The number of account-based requests that resulted in Apple only providing non-content data, such as subscriber, account connections or transactional information, in response to a valid legal request. We count each account-based request where we provide only non-content data and report the total number of such instances by country/region.

of Account Requests Where Content Data Provided

The number of account-based requests that resulted in Apple providing content data, such as stored photos, email, iOS device backups, contacts or calendars, in response to a valid legal request. We count each account-based request where we provide content data and report the total number of such instances by country/region.

% of Account Requests Where Data Provided

The percentage of account-based requests that resulted in Apple providing either non-content and/or content data. We calculate this based on the number of account-based requests that resulted in Apple providing data (including both non-content and content) per country/region, compared to the total number of account-based requests Apple received from that country/region.



**Table 4: Worldwide Government Account Preservation Requests
January 1 - June 30, 2019**

Table 4 provides information regarding account preservation requests received. Under the U.S. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) government agencies may request Apple to preserve users' account data by performing a one-time data pull of the requested existing user data available at the time of the request for 90 days (up to 180 days if Apple receives a renewal request). Examples of such requests are where law enforcement agencies suspect an account may have been used unlawfully or in violation of Apple's terms of service, and request Apple to preserve the account data while they obtain legal process for the data.

Country or Region ¹	# of Account Preservation Requests Received	# of Accounts Specified in the Requests	# of Accounts Where Data Preserved
Asia Pacific			
Australia	6	22	10
Japan	1	1	1
New Zealand	2	5	4
Singapore	1	1	1
Asia Pacific Total	10	29	16
Europe, Middle East, India, Africa			
Austria	1	1	1
Belgium	2	2	2
Denmark	3	3	1
Finland	4	11	5
France	1	1	1
Germany	6	11	9
Greece	1	3	3
India	4	6	4
Ireland	3	3	3
Italy	2	4	4
Netherlands	5	10	7
Norway	2	2	1
Portugal	1	1	1
Russia	2	4	4
Spain	2	2	1
Sweden	11	24	22
Switzerland	2	4	3
Ukraine	3	5	1
United Kingdom	42	102	53
Europe, Middle East, India, Africa Total	97	199	126
Latin America			
Argentina	2	3	3
Brazil	15	80	61
Latin America Total	17	83	64
North America			
Canada	16	25	22
United States of America	2,476	6,353	4,521
North America Total	2,492	6,378	4,543
Worldwide Total	2,616	6,689	4,749

¹ Only countries / regions where Apple received account preservation requests during the report period of January 1 - June 30, 2019, are listed.

of Account Preservation Requests Received

The number of account preservation requests received from a government agency. We count each individual request received from each country/region and report the total number of requests received by country/region.

of Accounts Specified in the Requests

The number of accounts specified in the requests. One request may contain one or multiple account identifiers. For example, in a case related to suspected illegal activity, law enforcement may request Apple to preserve information related to several accounts in a single request. We count the number of accounts identified in each request, received from each country/region, and report the total number of accounts specified in requests received by country/region.

of Accounts Where Data Preserved

The number of accounts that resulted in Apple preserving data in response to a valid preservation request. We count the number of accounts in each request where data was preserved and report the total number of accounts for which data was preserved by country/region.



**Table 5: Worldwide Government Account Restriction/Deletion Requests
January 1 - June 30, 2019**

Table 5 provides information regarding account restriction/deletion requests received. Examples of such requests are where law enforcement agencies suspect an account may have been used unlawfully or in violation of Apple’s terms of service, and request Apple to restrict or delete the account. For requests seeking to restrict/delete a customer’s Apple ID, Apple requires a court order (including conviction or warrant) demonstrating that the account to be restricted/deleted was used unlawfully, except in situations where the case has been verified by Apple to relate to child endangerment.

Country or Region ¹	# of Account Restriction/ Account Deletion Requests Received	# of Accounts Specified in the Requests	# of Requests Rejected/ Challenged Where No Action Taken	# of Account Restriction Requests Where Account Restricted	# of Account Deletion Requests Where Account Deleted
Europe, Middle East, India, Africa					
Pakistan	1	1	0	1	0
Sweden	1	2	0	1	0
United Kingdom	3	4	0	3	0
Europe, Middle East, India, Africa Total	5	7	0	5	0
North America					
Canada ²	1	1	0	0	0
United States of America	6	7	0	3	3
North America Total	7	8	0	3	3
Worldwide Total	12	15	0	8	3

¹ Only countries / regions where Apple received account restriction/deletion requests during the report period of January 1 - June 30, 2019, are listed.

² Account restriction/deletion action was not taken as account had prior restrictions in place due to violation of Apple’s terms of service.

**# of Account
Restriction/Account
Deletion Requests
Received**

The number of requests received from a government agency seeking to restrict or delete a customer’s Apple account. We count each individual request received from each country/region and report the total number of requests received by country/region.

**# of Accounts
Specified in the
Requests**

The number of accounts specified in the requests. One request may contain one or multiple account identifiers. For example, in a case related to possession or distribution of illegal material, law enforcement may request Apple to restrict or delete several accounts in a single request. We count the number of accounts identified in each request, received from each country/region, and report the total number of accounts specified in requests received by country/region.

**# of Requests
Rejected/
Challenged Where
No Action Taken**

The number of account restriction/deletion requests that resulted in Apple challenging or rejecting the request based on grounds such as a request does not have a valid legal basis, or is unclear, inappropriate, and/or over-broad, or where it is not accompanied by a court order (including conviction or warrant) demonstrating that the account to be restricted/deleted was used unlawfully; and where no action was taken by Apple. We count each account restriction/deletion request where we challenge or reject it and report the total number of such instances by country/region.

**# of Account
Restriction
Requests Where
Account Restricted**

The number of account restriction requests where Apple determined the request and order sufficiently demonstrated the account to be restricted was used unlawfully and we proceeded with the requested restriction. We count each account restriction request where we proceeded with restriction and report the total number of such instances by country/region.

**# of Account
Deletion Requests
Where Account
Deleted**

The number of account deletion requests where Apple determined the request and order sufficiently demonstrated the account to be deleted was used unlawfully and we deleted the Apple account. We count each account deletion request where we deleted an account and report the total number of such instances by country/region.



**Table 6: Worldwide Government Emergency Requests
January 1 - June 30, 2019**

Table 6 provides information regarding emergency requests received. Under the U.S. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) government agencies may request Apple to voluntarily disclose information, including customer information and contents of communications, to a government entity if Apple believes in good faith that an emergency involving imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires such disclosure without delay. International agencies may make similar requests to Apple under applicable local law. Examples of such requests are where a person may be missing and law enforcement believes the person may be in danger. Emergency requests generally seek details of customers' connections to Apple services.

Country or Region ¹	# of Emergency Requests Received	# of Requests Rejected/Challenged & No Data Provided	# of Emergency Requests Where No Data Provided	# of Emergency Requests Where Data Provided	% of Emergency Requests Where Data Provided
Asia Pacific					
Australia	4	0	0	4	100%
China mainland	1	0	0	1	100%
Japan	7	0	0	7	100%
New Zealand	2	0	0	2	100%
Singapore	1	0	0	1	100%
South Korea	1	0	0	1	100%
Taiwan	4	0	0	4	100%
Asia Pacific Total	20	0	0	20	100%
Europe, Middle East, India, Africa					
Belgium	1	0	0	1	100%
France	12	0	0	12	100%
Germany	20	0	1	19	95%
India	3	1	0	2	67%
Ireland	2	0	1	1	50%
Italy	1	0	0	1	100%
Liechtenstein	1	0	0	1	100%
Netherlands	8	0	0	8	100%
Poland	1	0	0	1	100%
Spain	1	0	0	1	100%
Sweden	2	0	0	2	100%
Switzerland	14	0	0	14	100%
United Kingdom	259	13	21	225	87%
Europe, Middle East, India, Africa Total	325	14	23	288	89%
Latin America					
Brazil	10	0	2	8	80%
Latin America Total	10	0	2	8	80%
North America					
Canada	33	0	2	31	94%
Mexico	4	0	0	4	100%
United States of America	206	4	17	185	90%
North America Total	243	4	19	220	91%
Worldwide Total	598	18	44	536	90%

¹ Only countries / regions where Apple received emergency requests during the report period of January 1 - June 30, 2019, are listed.



of Emergency Requests Received

The number of emergency requests received from a government agency. We count each individual request received from each country/region and report the total number of requests received by country/region.

of Requests Rejected/Challenged & No Data Provided

The number of emergency requests that resulted in Apple challenging or rejecting the request based on grounds such as a request is unclear, inappropriate, or fails to demonstrate that it relates to an emergency circumstance; and where no data was provided. We count each emergency request where we challenge or reject it and report the total number of such instances by country/region.

of Emergency Requests Where No Data Provided

The number of emergency requests that resulted in Apple providing no data. For example, instances where there was no responsive data. We count each emergency request where we do not provide data and report the total number of such instances by country/region.

of Emergency Requests Where Data Provided

The number of emergency requests that resulted in Apple providing data, such as connections to Apple services, subscriber or transactional information, in response to a valid emergency request. We count each emergency request where we provide data and report the total number of such instances by country/region.

% of Emergency Requests Where Data Provided

The percentage of emergency requests that resulted in Apple providing data. We calculate this based on the number of emergency requests that resulted in Apple providing data per country/region, compared to the total number of emergency requests Apple received from that country/region.



**Table 7: United States Government National Security Requests
January 1 - June 30, 2019**

Table 7 provides information regarding United States national security requests that Apple received for customer data, including orders received under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") and National Security Letters ("NSLs"). To date, Apple has not received any orders for bulk data.

We report national security requests received for Apple users/accounts (NSLs and orders received under FISA) within ranges permissible by law pursuant to the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 ("USA Freedom"). In order to report FISA non-content and content requests in separate categories, Apple is required by law to delay reporting by 6 months and report in bands of 500. Though we want to be more specific, this is currently the range permitted under USA Freedom for reporting this level of detail regarding national security requests.

National Security Request Type	# of Requests Received	# of Users/Accounts
FISA Non-Content Requests	0 - 499	11,000 - 11,499
FISA Content Requests	0 - 499	18,000 - 18,499
National Security Letters	0 - 499	2,500 - 2,999
National Security Letters where non-disclosure order lifted	0	

National Security Request Type FISA Non-Content & Content Requests: FISA Court issued orders for non-content or content data. Non-content data is data such as subscriber or transactional information and connection logs. Content data is data such as stored photos, email, iOS device backups, contacts or calendars.

National Security Letters: Federal Bureau of Investigation issued requests for non-content data in national security investigations. Non-content data is data such as subscriber data. Apple does not produce transactional information and connection logs in response to National Security Letters.

of Requests Received The number of United States National Security requests received. We count each individual order and National Security Letter received for Apple users/accounts and report the total number of orders and National Security Letters received within bands/ranges permissible by law. Pursuant to USA Freedom, to report the number of non-content and content orders received, we are limited to providing this data in bands of 500.

of Users/Accounts We count the number of users/accounts in each request received for which Apple has data and report the total number of users/accounts within bands permissible by law. Pursuant to USA Freedom, we are limited to providing this data in bands of 500.



**Tables 8, 9, 10: United States Government Requests by Legal Process Type
January 1 - June 30, 2019**

Tables 8, 9, and 10 provide information regarding United States requests by legal process type. Legal process types can be Search Warrants, Wiretap Orders, Pen Register/Trap and Trace Orders, Other Court Orders, or Subpoenas.

Table 8: United States Government Device Requests by Legal Process Type

Table 8 provides information regarding the types of legal process Apple received as Device Requests.

# of Device Requests	Search Warrants	Wiretap Orders	Pen Register/Trap & Trace Orders	Other Court Orders	Subpoenas
4,796	457	N/A	1	166	4,172
% of Total (100%)	10%	-	~0%	3%	87%

Table 9: United States Government Financial Identifier Requests by Legal Process Type

Table 9 provides information regarding the types of legal process Apple received as Financial Identifier Requests.

# of Financial Identifier Requests	Search Warrants	Wiretap Orders	Pen Register/Trap & Trace Orders	Other Court Orders	Subpoenas
918	113	N/A	0	51	754
% of Total (100%)	12%	-	0%	6%	82%

Table 10: United States Government Account Requests by Legal Process Type

Table 10 provides information regarding the types of legal process Apple received as Account Requests.

# of Account Requests	Search Warrants	Wiretap Orders	Pen Register/Trap & Trace Orders	Other Court Orders	Subpoenas
3,619	1,734	0	69	266	1,550
% of Total (100%)	48%	0%	2%	7%	43%



of Device/ Financial Identifier/ Account Requests

The total number of United States government requests Apple received by request type (Device, Financial Identifier, and Account). We count each individual request received from the United States by request type and report the total number of requests received by request type.

Search Warrants

A search warrant is a judicial document used in a criminal case authorizing law enforcement officers to search a person or place to obtain evidence. The Fourth Amendment requires that law enforcement officers obtain search warrants by submitting affidavits and other evidence to a judge or magistrate to meet a burden of proof that a search will yield evidence related to a crime. The judge or magistrate will issue the warrant if satisfied that the law enforcement officers have met the burden of proof. For customer content, Apple requires a search warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause in order to provide content.

Wiretap Orders

A wiretap order is a specific type of court order used in a criminal case that authorizes law enforcement officers to obtain contents of communications in real-time. A Title III wiretap order includes requirements that law enforcement officers make an application and furnish evidence to a judge or magistrate to demonstrate there is probable cause to believe that interception of communications will yield evidence related to a particular crime, there is probable cause to believe that an individual has committed or is about to commit a particular crime and must specifically identify the individual/target whose communications are to be intercepted. A statement must also be included as to whether other investigatory measures have been tried and failed or are unlikely to succeed. If satisfied that the requirements have been met, the judge or magistrate will issue the wiretap order. A wiretap order allows the government to obtain content on a forward-looking basis for a specific limited period of time as opposed to stored historical content. Apple can intercept users' iCloud email communications upon receipt of a valid Wiretap Order. Apple cannot intercept users' iMessage or FaceTime communications as these communications are end-to-end encrypted.

Pen Register/Trap & Trace Orders

A pen register or trap and trace order is a specific type of court order used in a criminal case authorizing law enforcement officers to obtain headers of electronic communications and other non-content data in real-time. A pen register order requires law enforcement officers to make a statement of offense which the pen register relates and certify the information likely to be obtained is relevant/material to an ongoing criminal investigation. The legal standard for obtaining a pen register order is lower than what is required for a search warrant or a wiretap order. A pen register order allows the government to obtain non-content data on a forward-looking basis for a specific limited period of time as opposed to stored historical information. A pen register order can be combined with a court order/warrant for historical records, in such instances we report the process type as pen register/trap and trace order.

Other Court Orders

A court order is a document issued by a judge or magistrate directing a person or entity to comply with the order. An order may be issued in either a criminal or civil case. Government agencies applying for an order in a criminal case must generally present facts and evidence to a judge or magistrate showing there are reasonable grounds to believe that the information sought is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation or similar legal standard. Non-content data such as subscriber and transaction information can be provided in response to a court order.

Subpoenas

A subpoena or equivalent legal process request (e.g. petition or summons) is a document issued by a government agency or court directing a person or entity to comply with requests for information. Local, state and federal government agencies may issue subpoenas. Under many jurisdictions, a judge or magistrate is not required to review a subpoena before it is issued. Accordingly, the subpoena has the lowest threshold for burden of proof. A subpoena may be issued in either a criminal or civil case. Non-content data such as device, subscriber and connection information can be provided in response to a subpoena.

% of Total

The percentage of requests by Legal Process Type. We calculate this based on the number of respective Legal Process Types compared to the respective total number of Device/Financial Identifier/Account Requests received by Apple.



**Table 11: United States Private Party Requests for Information
January 1 - June 30, 2019**

Table 11 provides information regarding United States private party (non-government) requests for information. Examples of such requests are where private litigants are involved in either civil or criminal proceedings. Apple complies with these requests insofar as we are legally required to do so.

# of Private Party Requests	# of Requests Rejected/ Challenged & No Data Provided	# of Requests Where No Data Provided	# of Requests Where Data Provided
243	142	32	69
% of Total (100%) ¹	58%	13%	28%

¹ Response percentages do not add up to 100% due to rounding.

- # of Private Party Requests** The number of requests received from private parties (non-government) in the United States seeking customer data related to specific devices, financial identifiers and/or accounts. We count each individual request received from private parties and report the total number of requests received.
- # of Requests Rejected/
Challenged & No Data Provided** The number of private party requests that resulted in Apple challenging or rejecting the request based on grounds such as a request does not have a valid legal basis, or is unclear and/or over-broad; and where no data was provided. We count each private party request where we challenge or reject it in full, and report the total number of such instances.
- # of Requests Where No Data Provided** The number of private party requests that resulted in Apple providing no data. For example, where there was no responsive data. We count each instance where we do not provide data in response to a private party request and report the total number of such instances.
- # of Requests Where Data Provided** The number of private party requests that resulted in Apple providing data in response to valid legal process or subscriber consent. We count each instance where we provide data in response to a private party request and report the total number of such instances.
- % of Total** The percentages are calculated based on the number of the respective response types compared to the total number of private party requests received by Apple.



**Table 12: United States Private Party Requests for Account Restriction/Deletion
January 1 - June 30, 2019**

Table 12 provides information regarding United States private party (non-government) requests for Apple account restriction/deletion. Examples of such requests are where private litigants are involved in either civil or criminal proceedings, and requests for Apple to restrict/delete an account may arise. For requests seeking to restrict/delete a customer’s Apple ID, Apple requires a court order. Apple complies with these requests insofar as we are legally required to do so.

# of Account Restriction/ Account Deletion Requests Received	# of Accounts Specified in the Requests	# of Requests Rejected/ Challenged Where No Action Taken	# of Account Restriction Requests Where Account Restricted	# of Account Deletion Requests Where Account Deleted
0	0	0	0	0

**# of Account
Restriction/Account
Deletion Requests
Received**

The number of requests received from private parties (non-government), such as participants in a civil or family law case, seeking to restrict or delete a customer’s Apple ID. We count each individual request received from private parties and report the total number of requests received.

**# of Accounts
Specified in the
Requests**

The number of accounts specified in the requests. One request may contain one or multiple account identifiers. For example, in a case related to multiple shared accounts, a private party may request Apple to restrict or delete several accounts in a single request. We count the number of accounts identified in each request received from private parties and report the total number of accounts specified in requests received.

**# of Requests
Rejected/Challenged
Where No Action
Taken**

The number of account restriction/deletion requests that resulted in Apple challenging or rejecting the request based on grounds such as a request does not have a valid legal basis, or is unclear, inappropriate, and/or over-broad, or where it is not accompanied by a court order demonstrating the grounds upon which the account is to be restricted/deleted; and where no action was taken by Apple. We count each account restriction/deletion request where we challenge or reject it and report the total number of such instances.

**# of Account
Restriction Requests
Where Account
Restricted**

The number of account restriction requests where Apple determined the request and order sufficiently demonstrated the grounds upon which the specified account was to be restricted; and we proceeded with the requested restriction. We count each account restriction request where we proceeded with restriction and report the total number of such instances.

**# of Account
Deletion Requests
Where Account
Deleted**

The number of account deletion requests where Apple determined the request and order sufficiently demonstrated the grounds upon which the specified account was to be deleted; and we deleted the Apple account. We count each account deletion request where we deleted an account and report the total number of such instances.



**Table 13: Worldwide Government App Store Takedown Requests - Legal Violations
January 1 - June 30, 2019**

Table 13 provides information regarding requests from government authorities to remove apps from the App Store based on alleged/suspected violations of local law. Examples of such requests are where law enforcement or regulatory agencies suspect an app may be unlawful or relate to/contain unlawful content. Apple complies with these requests insofar as we are legally required to do so.

Country or Region ¹	# of Legal Violation Takedown Requests Received	# of Apps Specified in the Requests	# of Requests Objected to in Part or Rejected in Full	# of Requests Where App Removed	# of Apps Removed ⁷
Asia Pacific					
China mainland ²	56	196	2	55	194
Vietnam ³	2	46	2	0	0
Asia Pacific Total	58	242	4	55	194
Europe, Middle East, India, Africa					
India ⁴	1	1	0	1	1
Israel ⁶	1	1	0	1	1
Lebanon ⁶	1	1	0	1	1
Pakistan ³	1	3	0	1	3
Russia ⁵	5	16	0	5	15
Turkey ³	2	2	0	2	2
United Arab Emirates ³	1	275	1	0	0
Europe, Middle East, India, Africa Total	12	299	1	11	23
Worldwide Total	70	541	5	66	217

¹ Only countries / regions where Apple received legal violation removal requests during the report period of January 1 - June 30, 2019, are listed.

² The majority of requests related to apps with pornography and illegal content.

³ Request(s) related to apps operating without government license or outside of government policies.

⁴ Request related to an app with alleged child pornography content.

⁵ Requests predominantly related to apps operating without government license and illegal gambling apps.

⁶ Request related to an app harmful to children.

⁷ App removals were limited to requesting country/region App Store storefront.

of Legal Violation Takedown Requests Received

The number of requests received from a government agency seeking to take down a third party application offered on the App Store related to alleged/suspected legal violations. We count each individual request received from each country or region and report the total number of requests received by country or region.

of Apps Specified in the Requests

The number of apps specified in the requests verified to be apps available on the App Store. One request may contain one or multiple apps. A government agency may request Apple to take down several apps in a single request. We count the number of apps identified in each request received from each country or region and report the total number of apps specified in requests received by country or region.

of Requests Objected to in Part or Rejected in Full

The number of app takedown requests related to alleged/suspected legal violations that resulted in Apple challenging or rejecting the request in part or in full based on grounds such as a request does not have a valid legal basis, or is unclear, inappropriate and/or over-broad, or does not sufficiently demonstrate the legal violation of the app to be removed. We count each App Store takedown request related to alleged/suspected legal violations where we challenge or reject it in part or in full and report the total number of such instances by country or region.

of Requests Where App Removed

The number of App Store takedown requests where the request sufficiently demonstrated a valid legal violation and Apple proceeded with removal of app(s) from the App Store. We count each app takedown request related to alleged/suspected legal violations where we proceeded with app removal and report the total number of such instances by country or region.

of Apps Removed

The number of App Store takedown requests where the request sufficiently demonstrated a valid legal violation and Apple proceeded with removal of app(s) from the App Store. We count each app takedown request related to alleged/suspected legal violations where we proceeded with app removal and report the total number of apps removed in such instances by country or region.



**Table 14: Worldwide Government App Store Takedown Requests - Platform Policy Violations
January 1 - June 30, 2019**

Table 14 provides information regarding requests from government authorities to remove apps from the App Store based on alleged/suspected violations of App Store platform policies. Examples of such requests are where law enforcement or regulatory agencies suspect an app may violate the App Store platform policies or relate to/contain content violating platform policies. Apple complies with these requests where Apple has determined there is an App Store platform policy violation.

Country or Region ¹	# of Platform Policy Violation Takedown Requests Received	# of Apps Specified in the Requests	# of Requests Objected to in Part or Rejected in Full	# of Requests Where App Removed	# of Apps Removed ³
Asia Pacific					
China mainland ²	22	94	0	22	94
Asia Pacific Total	22	94	0	22	94
Europe, Middle East, India, Africa					
Russia ²	3	3	0	3	3
Europe, Middle East, India, Africa Total	3	3	0	3	3
Worldwide Total	25	97	0	25	97

¹ Only countries / regions where Apple received platform violation removal requests during the report period of January 1 - June 30, 2019, are listed.

² Vast majority of requests related to apps with illegal gambling.

³ App removals were worldwide.

of Platform Policy Violation Takedown Requests Received

The number of requests received from a government agency seeking to take down a third party application offered on the App Store related to alleged/suspected platform policy violations. We count each individual request received from each country or region and report the total number of requests received by country or region.

of Apps Specified in the Requests

The number of apps specified in the requests verified to be apps available on the App Store. One request may contain one or multiple apps. A government agency may request Apple to take down several apps in a single request. We count the number of apps identified in each request received from each country or region and report the total number of apps specified in requests received by country or region.

of Requests Objected to in Part or Rejected in Full

The number of app takedown requests related to alleged/suspected platform policy violations that resulted in Apple challenging or rejecting the request in part or in full based on grounds such as a request does not have a valid legal basis, or is unclear, inappropriate and/or over-broad, or does not sufficiently demonstrate the platform policy violation of the app to be removed. We count each App Store takedown request related to alleged/suspected platform policy violations where we challenge or reject it in part or in full and report the total number of such instances by country or region.

of Requests Where App Removed

The number of App Store takedown requests where Apple determined the request sufficiently demonstrated a valid App Store platform policy violation and Apple proceeded with removal of app(s) from the App Store. We count each app takedown request related to alleged/suspected platform policy violations where we proceeded with app removal and report the total number of such instances by country or region.

of Apps Removed

The number of App Store takedown requests where Apple determined the request sufficiently demonstrated a valid App Store platform policy violation and Apple proceeded with removal of app(s) from the App Store. We count each app takedown request related to alleged/suspected platform policy violations where we proceeded with app removal and report the total number of apps removed in such instances by country or region.



Matters of note in this report:

Government requests related to customer data / accounts

Table 1 Worldwide Government Device Requests

Australia - High number of devices specified in requests predominantly due to a theft investigation.

Finland - High number of devices specified in requests predominantly due to a theft investigation.

Germany - High volume of device requests predominantly due to stolen device investigations.

Hungary - High volume of devices specified in requests predominantly due to a tax fraud investigation.

Poland - High number of devices specified in requests predominantly due to a tax fraud investigation from Customs and Revenue Authorities.

South Korea - High number of devices specified in requests predominantly due to stolen device investigations.

United States - High volume of device requests predominantly due to stolen device investigations.

Table 2 Worldwide Government Financial Identifier Requests

China mainland - High number of financial identifiers specified in requests predominantly due to a purchase fraud investigation and iTunes Gift Card fraud.

Germany - High number of financial identifier requests predominantly due to iTunes Gift Card and credit card fraud investigations.

Japan - High number of financial identifier requests predominantly due to investigations of unauthorized access to iTunes Gift Cards and iTunes Gift Card fraud.

Spain - High number of financial identifier requests predominantly due to iTunes Gift Card and credit card fraud investigations.

United Kingdom: High number of financial identifiers specified in requests predominantly due to a credit card fraud investigation and iTunes Gift Card fraud investigations.

United States - High number of financial identifier requests predominantly due to iTunes Gift Card and credit card fraud investigations.

Table 3 Worldwide Government Account Requests

Brazil - High number of accounts specified in court orders; investigation type was not indicated in these orders.

China mainland - High number of accounts specified in requests predominantly due to financial fraud and phishing investigations.

United States - High number of accounts specified in requests predominantly due to fraud and suspected unauthorized account access/phishing investigations.

Table 5 Worldwide Government Account Restriction/Deletion Requests

Canada - Account restriction/deletion action was not taken as account had prior restrictions in place due to violation of Apple's terms of service.

Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) Requests

Requests received from a foreign government pursuant to the MLAT process or through other cooperative efforts with the United States government are included in Apple's transparency report. Apple has been able to determine 11 MLAT requests for information were issued by the United States government in this reporting period. However, this may not be the precise number of MLAT requests received, as in some instances a United States court order or search warrant may not indicate that it is the result of an MLAT request. In instances where the originating country was identified, we count and report the MLAT request under the country of origin. In instances where the originating country was not identified, we count and report the request under the United States of America.



Matters of note in this report:

Government requests related to app removals

Table 13 Worldwide Government App Store Takedown Requests - Legal Violations

China mainland - The majority of requests related to apps with pornography and illegal content.

India - Request related to an app with alleged child pornography content.

Israel - Request related to an app harmful to children.

Lebanon - Request related to an app harmful to children.

Pakistan - Request related to apps operating without government license.

Russia - Requests predominantly related to illegal gambling apps and apps operating without government license.

Turkey - Requests related to an app operating without government license and an app with illegal content.

United Arab Emirates - Request related to apps operating outside of government policies.

Vietnam - Requests related to gaming apps operating without government license.

Table 14 Worldwide Government App Store Takedown Requests - Platform Policy Violations

China mainland - The vast majority of requests related to apps with illegal gambling.

Russia - Requests related to apps with illegal gambling.

Matters of note for future reports

In addition to reporting on Government requests to remove Apps from the App Store in instances related to alleged violations of legal and/or policy provisions, starting with the Transparency Report period July 1 - December 31, 2019, Apple will report on appeals received pursuant to such Government requests.